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ABSTRACT
Most studies of Nazi propaganda have focused on events 
inside Germany. This thesis proposes to examine German 
efforts in the United States in the years before American 
entry into the Second World War. This will be done by 
examining one Nazi agency: the German Library of Information 
which operated out of New York City from 1936 to 1941.
The first chapter explores the formation of the German 
Library of Information and its goals. The question of whether 
it was controlled by the Foreign Office or the Propaganda 
Ministry is also discussed.
The second chapter covers the association between the 
German Library of Information and George Sylvester Viereck. 
This relationship was an important part of the expansion of 
the organization after the outbreak of World War II. Viereck 
provided the German Library of Information with most of its 
editorial guidance.
The third chapter delves into the German Library of 
Information's publication of propaganda pamphlets. Each of 
the major pamphlets is examined in detail. These works 
attempted to blame Britain for the outbreak, continuation and 
expansion of World War II. The publications also stressed
vi
the economic and military strength of Germany and urged the 
United States to stay out of the war.
Chapter four focuses on the German Library of 
Information's weekly magazine Facts in Review. The magazine 
was set up to provide Americans with the German point of view 
on world events. Facts in Review continued the theme of 
British responsibility for the war. Germany's policies in 
Europe were explained in its pages as similar to American 
policies in Latin America. Facts in Review tried to convince 
its readers that they had the most to gain by working with, 
not against, the Third Reich.
Chapter Five discusses the Dies Committee investigation 
into the German Library of Information's activities. In 
addition to covering the demise of the German Library of 
Information, this chapter also discusses the fate of its 
American editor George Viereck.
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Chapter One
The Origins of the German Library of Information
In August 1934 an Attache at the Washington Embassy, 
Richard Sallet, sent a telegram to his superiors at the 
Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. He urged Berlin to consider 
setting up an official organization to explain Germany's view 
of current events. This would take the form of an official 
information library to counter anti-German propaganda in the 
United States. His letter read in part: "[it is] urgently 
necessary . . .  to start a library of information in the near 
future. The population of the middle size and small towns 
desire positive information about Germany and it would be a 
sin of omission which it would be difficult to repair if we 
were to cede this ground too to the unceasing propaganda of 
our enemies."1 For two years, however, this advice was not 
acted upon. It was not until May 1936 that an information 
library was set up in New York City along the lines of a 
traditional information/cultural center.1 2 As tension
1 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series C 
Volume III, June 14, 1934 - March 31, 1935 (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1959), 1111-1115. Hereafter cited as DGFP. 
Letter from Sallet to Berlin, August 3, 1934.
2 For the founding of the German Library see Office of United 
States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington: United States Government Printing
9
10
increased in Europe, the Library gradually became involved 
in outright propaganda activities. This expanded role was 
defined in a memorandum written by the German Charge Affairs 
in Washington D.C., Dr. Hans Thomsen, on September 18, 1939.3 
In this dispatch he despaired that Germany was falling behind 
in the propaganda contest in the United States. He felt that 
Americans needed to be given access to the German point of 
view in those turbulent times. The German Library of 
Information was clearly the best vehicle available to spread 
this information. Specifically, he recommended that the 
Library operate under seven guidelines.4
First, he believed that the organization should stay 
clear of openly associating with the Roosevelt 
administration's domestic opposition. The Library should 
distance itself from the embassy and consulates, and from 
groups and individuals that sought similar goals in order to 
avoid the possibility of German affiliation sullying these 
groups' reputations. This would obviously have precluded any 
appeal to the substantial German-American population of the
Office, 1947), 557. This document was the interrogation of Heribert von 
Strempel, First secretary at the Washington Embassy and it gave his 
version of how the Library came into being. Strempel's recollection put 
the founding of the Library in 1937. Since he was not yet with the 
Embassy at the time it was founded, and because the United States 
Government investigation of the German Library put the date of its 
founding in May 1936, the latter date has been chosen.
3 DGFP Series D, Volume VIII, 89-91 and 127-129. The infamous 
Kristallnacht of November 9, 1938 had provoked the United States to 
withdraw its ambassador to Germany. Germany retaliated and this left the 
Charge (Thomsen) in control.
4 Ibid., 127.
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United States. Second, he cautioned against optimism for more 
than limited objectives in America as he believed that anti- 
German feeling was prevalent among the American people.
Third, he felt that the Library should seek to invoke U.S. 
history and the experience of World War I to convince 
Americans that their interests would not be served by 
entering into another European conflict. This, Thomsen 
contended, would best be accomplished by focusing on the 
heavy casualty rate of World War I, the failure of America to 
recover its loans from its allies, and Britain's duplicitous 
dealings. Next he recommended that not only should the 
Library shy away from openly attacking Roosevelt, it should 
stay out of American politics altogether. This was certainly 
advocated with an eye to the embarrassment the Germans had 
felt over the exposure of the clear linkage between German 
Embassy officials and the Friends of the New Germany (as the 
German-American Bund was then known). Such blatant 
association should not be repeated in the case of the German 
Library.5 Fifth, he urged against false optimism in Berlin 
over such legislation as the Neutrality Acts, pointing out 
that these acts, although better than active American 
intervention, still favored Britain and France. Sixth, he 
suggested that the most effective tool for propaganda was to
5 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 552-3, has a discussion of some 
of the discomfort caused by the confrontation between Washington and 
Berlin over the ties between the German Embassy and the Bund. The 
Germans would be more cautious in the future.
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stress Germany's support for the Monroe Doctrine and to 
assert that Nazi actions in Europe represented a German 
version of the doctrine. Finally, he warned against using 
too crude an approach in propaganda and recommended that 
American domestic sources be used whenever possible, i.e., 
books and pamphlets actually written and published by 
Americans.
This appeal for increased German propaganda did not 
include active collaboration with the pro-Nazi political 
groups in America such as the Friends of the New Germany, 
later known as the German-American Bund. Thomsen expressly 
warned his superiors in Berlin that to link the German 
government too closely with such groups would be counter­
productive. Certainly, any trip by the leaders of the 
Library, as Fritz Kuhn (the leader of the Bund) had taken to 
visit Hitler, would scuttle any attempts to present the 
Library as an "objective" organization. Thomsen also 
contended that the propaganda campaign should avoid openly 
supporting the American isolationist movement. German 
support, it was feared, would give the American opponents of 
isolation the ammunition necessary to repeal the Neutrality 
Acts or to enact legislation blatantly pro-British, such as 
the later Lend-Lease Act.
Thus, in addition to Hitler's general ideas on 
propaganda, Thomsen added specific considerations for the
13
German Library. These two sets of guidelines did not conflict 
with one another. Hitler's idea of the simple theme 
constantly repeated might seem to contradict Thomsen's fear 
of too crude an approach in America. Yet, as will be shown 
these potential ideological conflicts were resolved without 
apparent tension.
Tension on a more basic level, however, existed between 
the Foreign Office under Ribbentrop's control and the 
Propaganda Ministry under Joseph Goebbels. The Third Reich 
was notorious for the competition between Hitler's underlings 
in their quest for individual power. This was certainly true 
in the case of foreign propaganda. An excellent example of 
the conflict that often occurred between the factions was 
given by a veteran member of the Washington Embassy, Dr. 
Heribert von Strempel:
German foreign policy was emerging on two parallel 
roads-the Foreign Office and the foreign section of the 
Party. As long as they remained parallel, the Foreign 
Office did not take special action . . . Our policy [at
the Foreign Office] was not to interfere with affairs in 
America which might have caused a breach of diplomatic 
relations. The activities of Mr.Kuhn [leader of the 
German-American Bund] and the foreign section of the 
Party were considered a burden on German-American 
relations, so Mr. Dieckhoff [the German ambassador to 
America] recommended that they be stopped.6
As far as the German Library was concerned, the 
relationship was clearer, but still somewhat murky. Von
6 Ibid., 553.
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Strempel tried to clarify the matter during interrogation by 
Captain Sam Harris:
Strempel: From 1939 on, the Library was controlled and 
financed by both the Ministry of Propaganda and the 
Department of Information in the Foreign Office. You 
see, in 1939, Hitler issued an order that from that time 
on, foreign propaganda would be handled by the Foreign 
Office.
Sam Harris: That would seem to indicate that the 
Foreign Office superseded the Propaganda Ministry in the 
German Library of Information?
Strempel: Well, not completely, the Library was under
the control of Dr. Hans Borchers . . . and . . .
Professor Mathias [sic] Schmitz . . . [both] of the
Foreign Office. Actually Schmitz was paid a salary by 
both the Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry, 
but accepted only the salary from the Foreign Office.7
This exchange is a convincing answer to the question of 
whether the Propaganda Ministry or the Foreign Ministry 
controlled the German Library of Information. Given the tone 
of its writings (except for Hitler's speeches the diatribe 
against the Jews never appears) and the frequent quoting of 
Ribbentrop (but never Goebbels) , along with Strempel's 
statement, it is clear that by the later period of its 
existence (1939-1941) the Library was controlled by the 
Foreign Ministry.
Although the Library avoided domestic opposition groups, 
it was involved with other German front organizations in the
7 Ibid., 557-8.
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United States. The pamphlets and writings of the German 
Library of Information frequently appeared at other 
organization's meetings, including domestic groups such as 
the Bund. The German Library distributed its publications 
free of charge, but as far as can be determined none of its 
officials directly associated themselves with any of these 
meetings. The Trans-Ocean news service and the German 
Railroads Information Office cooperated with the Library, 
primarily providing assistance and cooperation in obtaining 
names for the Library's mailing list.8
The mailing practices of the Library would lead to 
trouble. Many of those who had applied for information about 
travel in Germany were surprised to find themselves regularly 
receiving German propaganda. Several individuals complained 
to their congressmen.9 This practice would eventually 
contribute to an investigation of the Library by the House 
Un-American Activities Committee. This, however was in the
8 The Trans-Ocean organization was a Propaganda Ministry news 
service. On several occasions it provided the Library with articles 
which it later published. The German Railroads Information Office is 
somewhat more obscure. It appears to have been under the control of both 
the Propaganda Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. For links between 
German Library and the Trans-Ocean News Service see U.S. House of 
Representatives. Special Committee to investigate Un-American Activities 
and Propaganda in the United States, Appendix, part 2, 75th Congress,
2nd Session. For more on the German Railroads Information Office See 0. 
John Rogge, The Official German Report (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 
1961), 55-6. Rogge was the Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney 
General in charge of the Wartime Sedition Case. The Official German 
Report was his story of the investigation into Nazi activities in the 
United States.
9 U.S. House of Representatives. Special Committee to investigate 
Un-American Activities and Propaganda in the United States, Appendix, 
part 2, 75th Congress, 2nd Session, 1053. Hereafter cited as Appendix.
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future. For the Library actions of greater importance were 
afoot. On September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland. The 
Second World War had begun. The Foreign Ministry had plans to 
greatly expand the Library's efforts. For this to occur, the 
German Library needed strong leadership, which it would soon 
find in the person of George Sylvester Viereck.
Chapter Two
George Sylvester Viereck and the Library
The most important link between the Library and other 
Nazi front groups was the German-American propagandist George 
Sylvester Viereck. Viereck was born in Munich in 1884, and had 
been active in propaganda in America as early as the First 
World War. As a United States citizen, his activities during 
that period had included the publication of a magazine 
called the Fatherland. The colorful and clever German- 
American resumed his activities when the Hitler regime took 
power. The Library retained Viereck to assist with the 
publication and distribution of its pamphlets and the weekly 
magazine Facts in Review. His duties included editing as well 
as providing substantially to the Library's mailing lists. 
Heribert von Strempel later explained why Viereck had been 
chosen for the job: "Viereck was chosen for these anti- 
British propagandist activities because he was considered an 
experienced American author who could manage efficiently 
and rather independently this anti-British propaganda 
[the Library and Viereck's publishing house, Flanders Hall] 
without interfering in the internal affairs of the United 
States." 1 1
1 Emphasis added. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 561.
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Viereck was also involved in other activities not 
directly related to the German Library. These included his 
publishing house —  Flanders Hall —  and numerous other 
commitments, all of which insured that he would would receive 
a large income. From each book published by Flanders Hall 
Viereck earned from $5,000 to $10,000.2 Clearly Viereck did 
not undertake his relationship with the Library out of 
financial necessity. Why, then, did George Viereck become 
involved with the Library?
In September 1939, when Viereck first began his 
activities on behalf of the Library, he made his intentions 
known when accepting the job in a letter to director Heinz 
Beller. He "would be glad to prepare . . . articles 
interpreting the German point of view based on data furnished 
by you."3 However, he made the limitations of this contract 
clear:
In the . . . remote contingency of a break between
the United States and Germany, we are both automatically 
released from any obligation flowing from this 
agreement . . . .  I shall not be asked to prepare or 
edit any matter derogatory to the United States, or to 
undertake any editorial assignment which could possibly 
conflict with American laws and my duties as an 
American citizen.4
2 The Official German Report, 135-6. Viereck also drew a salary of 
$500 a month from a German newspaper and an additional $500 per month 
from the Library (although this latter amount would increase).
3 Reprinted in Appendix, 1050.
Ibid., 1051.4
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Certainly this closing of a private letter shows no un- 
American cynicism on the part of Viereck towards his German 
Library activities. Whatever else may be said about the man 
and his activities, he seems to have sincerely wished to 
avoid conflict between America and Germany. What is beyond 
question is that his talents greatly aided the German Library 
and especially Facts in Review. In the opinion of Ambassador 
Dieckhoff, Viereck "plays a decisive part in the publication 
of the Embassy Journal Facts in Review. He may be called the 
most valuable liaison agent of the Information Section [of 
the Foreign Office] in the United States."5
George Viereck, while not officially recognized as the 
editor of Facts in Review, did much to improve the little 
magazine. Certainly he felt that he did an excellent job. In 
fact he wrote to Matthias Schmitz, Beller's successor as 
director of the Library, asking for an increase in salary:
When I was first associated with Facts in Review, 
its circulation did not exceed a few thousand copies, 
and you did not print more than four pages a week. Today 
the circulation is nearly 100,000 and you print 16 
pages every week, not to speak of occasional extra 
numbers. While undoubtedly the lion's share of this 
success is due to your own editorial guidance, I have 
some share in the success of the venture.6
Then Viereck got down to his real purpose,
5 Memorandum of German Foreign Office dated March 3, 1941, quoted 
in Official German Report, 132-3.
6 Letter Jan 25, 1941 G. S. Viereck to Matthias Schmitz.Reprinted 
in Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn, Sabotage: The Secret War Against 
America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), 172.
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You asked me what would be equitable renumeration 
. . . . I reached the figure of $2,500 per month . . .
American magazines never pay me less than $500 per 
article. . . . The work I do in revising and preparing
material for Facts in Review is equal to at least four 
or five articles monthly. For the sum mentioned I 
shall continue my work for Facts in Review and act as 
your chief literary advisor on all books sponsored by 
the Library.7
It is interesting how Viereck chose to close his letter to 
Schmitz. "You [are] a man who, like myself, . . . considers
no task more sublime than to break down with the battering 
ram of truth the barriers of hate and misunderstanding which 
[British] propaganda, abetted by malice and ignorance, 
attempts to rear between your country and my own, the United 
States."8
While the retention of Viereck was of help to the German 
Library, the association violated Thomsen's guidelines for 
German propaganda activity in the United States. Clearly it 
would be to Germany's benefit if domestic opposition to 
Roosevelt's increasing intervention in the war was seen to be 
independent of German "control". Certainly, the relationship 
with Viereck was not publicized. Rather, the Special 
Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, O. John Rogge, 
discovered the link, and afterward used it to prosecute 
Viereck for sedition. Viereck was eventually convicted for
7 Ibid. See also Rogge, The Official German Report, 135 for total 
amounts Viereck received from the German Library . For 1940 he was paid 
$31,552.43 and for 1941 (from January to June) $32,294.09. His letter 
seems to have paid some dividends.
8 Sabotage, 172.
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failing to register properly under the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act. However, he had escaped an earlier 
conviction in 1942 under this act when the Supreme Court 
overturned the case on a technicality. Rogge clearly feared 
the possibility that Viereck would again avoid conviction 
when he wrote his book The Official German Report (September 
1946) .
Among those who argued against Viereck's conviction had 
been North Dakota Senator William Langer. Viereck wrote to 
Langer requesting assistance.9 Langer supported Viereck: 
"Because of that wrongful conviction, Mr. Viereck has been 
put to a tremendous expense. . . .  I shall submit a 
resolution to . . . [the Senate] to decide on a sum which . .
. will compensate him for the time he spent in jail . . .Mr.
Viereck will get such justice as Congress may be able to give 
him . . .  to wipe out the wrong which has been done."10 1 In the 
Senate Langer did just that. He came out vigorously in 
support of those on trial along with Viereck for sedition: 
"Some of the outstanding lawyers in Washington are almost 
unanimous in their opposition of what they term a legal 
farce, or a perversion of justice."11 Rogge, in order to 
counter the support given by the senator, accused Langer of
9 For the content of Viereck's plea, see below p. 64.
10 Rogge, The Official German Report, 44 0.
11 Senator William Langer, address before the United States 
Senate, September 8, 1944. Congressional Record Volume 90, part 6 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 7624.
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"a checkered political career" for his activities in land 
dealings in Mexico and other supposedly shady dealings. He 
concluded, "In view of Viereck's record, and also [of]
Senator Langer's, I submit that Senator Langer's support of 
Viereck's demand for clemency should carry no weight."12 This 
was all in Viereck's future. In September 1939 if an 
individual such as Viereck was interested in Germany and 
chose to use the Library's materials (a possible explanation) 
that was his own business. After all, the reason for the 
Library was to give Americans access to the "other side".
12 The Official German Report, 444. Viereck spent two and a half 
years in prison for failing to fully report his activities, see below 
p. 64. He was never convicted on the sedition charge. The case against 
Viereck and several others was dismissed after the war ended.
Chapter Three
Pamphlets
The German Library of Information's first publications 
were translations of official government documents. While the 
pamphlets as a general rule were basically reprints of 
official German "white books" originally published in 
Germany, the German Library supplied prefaces to these works, 
thereby fulfilling its mission to provide Americans with the 
German point of view on major issues.
The first pamphlet, published in 1939 under the title, 
The Exchange of Communications Between the President of the 
United States and the Chancellor of the German Reich: April 
1939, was a reprint of Roosevelt's famous speech to Hitler, 
urging him to take a peaceful course in Europe, and Hitler's 
reply to this message, rejecting Roosevelt's request for a 
German guarantee of neutrality toward several small nations. 
Hitler brushed aside Roosevelt's fears, alleging that his 
concerns amounted to hysteria "which makes even the landing 
of Martians seem possible"1 (this was a reference to Orson 
Welles' broadcast of the War of the Worlds in 1938 that had 1
1 Exchange of Communications Between the President of the United 
States and the Chancellor of the German Reich: April 1939. (New York:
23
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caused mass hysteria in the United States.) While this 
document is interesting to the student of history, it 
represented an early stage of the German Library's 
propaganda. As a simple reprint of a German document, this 
work tells little about the opinions of the Library. Of more 
interest was the open acknowledgement of the German Library 
as part of the Consulate in New York, although the Library 
would soon try to distance itself from the stigma of being an 
official German agency.
The volume titled Documents Concerning the Last Phase of 
the German-Polish Crisis is more revealing. Clearly its 
reasoning is based on one premise: the underlying 
responsibility of Britain for the war. This argument was 
based on the then-current idea that World War I had begun 
because of Germany's "Blank Check" to Austria-Hungary. This 
supposedly had encouraged the Habsburg nation to attack 
Serbia. The conflict rapidly escalated into a European-wide 
conflagration. The Library argued that Britain repeated this 
mistake in 1939 by supporting Poland. The pamphlet argued 
that, "Germany's demands [about the Polish Corridor] were so 
reasonable that no sane Polish Government would have dared to 
reject them. They certainly would have been accepted if 
England had advised moderation."2 As Germany had failed to 
restrain its ally in 1914, so had Britain failed to convince
German Library of Information, 1939).
2 Documents Concerning the Last Phase of the German-Polish Crisis 
(New York: German Library of Information, 1939) 6.
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Poland to accede to German claims in 1939. The conclusion was 
obvious: America needed to realize that it was "England that 
forced the sword into his [Hitler's] hand."3 This pamphlet set 
one of the primary themes for German Library propaganda, 
namely that Britain, by its interference on the European 
continent, had made Germany's situation in Europe impossible.
The next Library work, Polish Acts of Atrocity Against 
the German Minority in Poland, published in 1940, repeated 
the theme. The body of this work was dedicated to describing 
in morbid detail the "systematic campaign of destruction, 
carried on not only by armed civilians, but by responsible 
officials of the Polish Government."4 What is interesting 
about this volume is the number of cases reported (250) , each 
of them in nauseating detail.5 Significantly, none of these 
atrocities took place prior to September 1, 1939. The Nazi 
justification for invading Poland to protect German nationals 
fell flat even in the German Library publication. After 
claiming the existence of a long-standing Polish government 
plan to exterminate the German minority in Poland, the 
pamphlet pointed to the ultimate responsibility of Britain: 
"Nor is it possible to forgive or forget that the 'Blank
3 Ibid., 3.
4 Polish Acts of Atrocity Against the German Minority in Poland 
(New York: German Library of Information, 1940), 10
5 Some of the titles of the interviews comprising the report were 
"Slay the Germans: Eyes Gouged out with Bayonets", "All Germans must be 
Butchered", "Legs and Hands Broken; Tongues, Noses, Ears Cut Off."
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Check' so hastily given to Poland by Mr. Chamberlain's 
Government and its failure to recommend the acceptance of 
Chancellor Hitler's generous terms were the signal for the 
slaughter of the German minority."6
The theme of British responsibility for the expanding 
war continued in Britain's Designs on Norway. It, like most 
of the German Library publications, consisted of a short 
introduction followed by various letters and other allegedly 
captured documents. In this work the German Library stated 
plainly its opinion of Britain's goals in the war:
Britain's strategy is always the same: adroit 
propaganda, a vast net of espionage, the creation of 
"fifth columns," and the attempt to inveigh into her 
web members of the government and the army of the State 
upon which she fastens her clutches. While engaged in 
this game she invariably hides her imperialistic schemes 
under the cloak of morality and wards off suspicion from 
herself by diverting it to others.7
Furthermore, Britain's Designs on Norway sought to remind 
Americans of Britain's abuse of neutral rights. Invoking the 
voice of Woodrow Wilson, the Library railed against Britain's 
resumption of the World War I practice of an "illegal and 
indefensible" blockade.8 In contrast to this the pamphlet 
claimed that Germany's "sole objective is to destroy the 
power of Great Britain to meddle in Continental affairs."9
6 Ibid., 11.
7 Britain’s Designs on Norway (New York: German Library of 
Information, 1940), xi.
8 Ibid., xiii.
Ibid.9
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In Allied Intrigue in the Low Countries, even neutral 
nations were alleged to be working towards the "overthrow of 
the German Government and the perpetuation of the intolerable 
condition existing on the Continent due to the incessant 
interferences of Great Britain." 10 It was concluded that the 
Allies planned to use the Low Countries as a springboard for 
an invasion of Germany, and therefore the German invasion and 
occupation of these nations was justified.11
The French Yellow Book: A Self Indictment extended the 
blame for the war to the Third Republic.10 2 The work claimed 
that "all the Fuehrer's efforts for peace were doomed to 
failure because they collided with the war plans of England 
and France."13 14 The documents contained in this volume 
supposedly made clear the war plans of the Allies. According 
to the German Library of Information this policy was 
"sometimes referred to as the 'policy of firmness' and 
sometimes frankly and harshly as 'encirclement'."1,5
10 Allied Intrigue in the Low Countries (New York: German Library 
of Information 1940), vii.
11 Planning between the Low Countries and the Allies did occur 
with good reason. The wisdom of this cooperation was shown by the well- 
known incident when early German invasion plans for the West (under the 
code name Case Yellow) fell into Belgian hands in January 1940. These 
plans made it clear that Germany intended to invade France via the Low 
Countries.
12 Which, incidentally, did not appear until 1941, after France 
had been defeated and the Third Republic had ceased to exist.
13 Dr. Friedrich Grimm, The French Yellow Book: A Self-Indictment 
(New York: German Library of Information, 1941), 9-10. The various 
pamphlets issued by the German Library sometimes listed authors, 
sometimes not.
14 Ibid., 42.
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The theme shifted back to the "evils of Britain" after 
the French Yellow Book. In the Second Hunger Blockade by 
Hermann Frisch, the words of President Woodrow Wilson 
regarding the illegality of a blockade were reiterated. 
Americans were reminded not only of the human suffering 
caused by naval blockades, but also of the opposition to the 
practice by many great American leaders. Regardless of the 
British attempts at blockade, the work sought to project an 
invulnerable Germany where "victory can no longer be 
endangered by a collapse of the home front."15
The Library believed Britain to be much nearer to 
defeat. The War in Maps, 1939/40, edited by Giselher Wirsing, 
was a pictorial history of "the practical expulsion of Great 
Britain from the European Continent, where she is an unwanted 
intruder."16 This work traced the progress of the war around 
the world until 1940. It is the best edited of all the 
pamphlets artistically, with good color maps. It sought to 
show England lusting for expansion and a France determined to 
humiliate Germany. Allied propaganda was dismissed as "a mask 
behind which hides, in England, the jingo lust for further 
enlargement of the Empire; and in France, the wish to . . .
prevent German unity at any price whatever."17
15 Hermann Frisch, The Second Hunger Blockade (New York: German 
Library of Information, 1941), 22.
16 Giselher Wirsing, ed. The War in Maps, 1939/40 (New York: The 
German Library of Information, 1941), i.
17 Ibid., 48.
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The next Library booklet, Werkstoffe: Miracles of German 
Chemistry, by Karl Dorn, affirmed Germany's ability to 
weather a British blockade of raw materials by the invention 
of marvelous synthetic substitutes, defined as "a working 
[synthetic] material . . . chiefly for industrial purposes."18 19
This work reminded the Library's readers of Germany's 
successful innovations in nitrate experiments in World War I. 
It maintained that Germany had developed workable substitutes 
for rubber, gasoline and other vital raw materials. It was 
asserted that these innovations were not merely ersatz 
materials of sub-par quality, but genuine scientific advances 
that would aid the world after the war. It is interesting to 
note that Werkstoffe took pains to assure America that these 
innovations would be shared with all; they were not 
attempts by Germany to abandon world trade via economic 
autarchy.
Somewhat different in character was Germany: Facts and 
Figures.19 Here the German Library of Information attempted to 
present a picture of a pacifistic Germany. The booklet 
stressed Nazi achievements and the religious solidarity 
between Catholic and Protestant Germans, and also minimized 
the idea of class conflicts within the Reich, or the demise 
of alternative political parties. It maintained the
18 Karl Dorn, Werkstoffe:Miracles of German Chemistry (New York: 
German Library of Information, 1941), v.
19 Germany: Facts and Figures (New York: German Library of 
Information, 1941).
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strength of the nation and its need for "living space" —  
the infamous Lebensraum. Most of all it pictured a virile, 
growing Germany forced to take a military option only when 
others failed to disarm (as they were supposed to under the 
terms of the Versailles Treaty), preventing the peaceful 
settlement of Europe's problems.
A Nation Builds: Contemporary German Architecture 
continued the trend. This pamphlet painted a picture of a 
strong, vital peace-loving Reich, more interested in 
autobahns than aeroplanes. The change of life since the 
National
Socialist regime was glorified: "The great building program 
which has been taking place in Germany during the last 6 
years . . . may be interpreted as the symbol of the
philosophy of life which animates the New Germany. Germany 
was building for peace."20 It also stressed the idea of a 
national theme that dominated all aspects of life. "All of 
the building encompassed in the plan expresses a unifying 
idea. . . . the ideas of social equality and national unity
which are the basic ideas of the New Germany."21 National 
Socialism was even given credit for truly uniting Germany. 
"[The autobahns] have performed a political and social 
mission as well. They have been an important factor in 
overcoming the sectional separateness, which has always been
20 A Nation Builds: Contemporary German Architecture (New York:
German Library of Information, 1941), 11.
21 Ibid., 11.
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a major problem in the creation of a united German state."22 
Thus, the pamphlet represented Germany as a strong peace- 
loving nation that was not threatening to Europe or America. 
Germany was the land of culture and could be dealt with and 
trusted.
Other works by the Library sought to show the artistic 
side of Germany that was all too frequently submerged by the 
aggressive activities of the Third Reich. A pamphlet was 
issued commemorating the romantic painter Casper David 
Friedrich. A book on German Christmas carols and toys was 
also published. These were a different approach by the 
Library, devoid of any stated political messages. No plea for 
American sympathy appeared. What was under the surface was 
plain: the Germany of Goethe, the artistic and peace-loving 
German, was still alive in the Third Reich. These efforts 
were more successful in eliciting understanding than dry 
discourses on Lebensraum or the German right to a 
readjustment of Versailles.
The last of the German Library pamphlets of concern 
here was a self-examination entitled The German Library of 
Information. Unlike the other pamphlets, The German Library 
of Information was a Library publication, not just a 
translation with an English preface. This work explained the 
details of the Library and its purpose.
22 Ibid., 117
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The German Library of Information was founded 
several years ago to satisfy American demands for 
detailed knowledge of all phases of German life. . . .
The fundamental aim of the German Library of 
Information in New York is to facilitate an 
understanding of Germany, [emphasis added] her 
countryside, her people, her government and her 
cultural heritage. . . .  By promoting a greater 
knowledge of Germany, it furthers understanding and 
good-will between two great nations.23
The German Library functioned "independent of the Consulate" 
and therefore was not an official government agency.24 
Presumably this would have made the Library's arguments more 
persuasive. The work hastened to remind Americans that the 
German Library of Information's goal (in reference to the 
weekly Facts in Review published by the German Library ) was 
to show "the 'other Germany,' which hostile propaganda 
constantly endeavors to consign to the past, remains an 
essential part of the Reich of today."25 A new era of 
cooperation, it claimed, would be the result of this new 
relationship: "By encouraging and enabling Americans to 
familiarize themselves with the German people and their 
heritage, the road to mutual
understanding is opened. . . . American and German culture
have long enriched each other. To the future belongs the task
23 The German Library of Information (New York: German Library of 
Information, 1941), 5.
24 This was a shift in the status of the Library. Recall that the 
German Library had earlier maintained that it was a part of the 
Consulate. Ibid., 19.
25 Ibid., 17.
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of still further increasing the understanding and 
collaboration between the two countries."26
26 ibid., 27.
Chapter Four 
Facts in Review
With the increasing international tensions and the 
threat of a war in Europe in 1939, the role of the German 
Library changed. As we have seen in the case of its 
pamphlets, the Library put out a rapidly increasing amount of 
propaganda. The most conspicuous evidence of this increase 
was the emergence of the weekly Facts in Review. Thomsen had 
written to Berlin in November 1939, informing his superiors 
that the "stiffening of German-American relations, which was 
being exploited by enemy propaganda, has made necessary since 
the beginning of the year a more active German propaganda in 
the United States. . . .nl He also told Berlin that the Trans-
Ocean Agency (which was controlled by the Propaganda 
Ministry) was recognized by Americans as obviously pro-Nazi.
He noted that "American newspapers avoid regular printing of 
Trans-Ocean material."1 2 These circumstances encouraged an 
expanded role for the German Library of Information. Thomsen, 
in a report to Berlin explained the situation: "In order to 
get over this boycott wall of the American press, the weekly 
periodical Facts in Review was founded, which now regularly
1 DGFP, Series D, Volume VII, 432-4
2 Ibid., 432.
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reaches 20,000 especially interested persons; all materials 
of the Foreign Ministry, particularly political reports, are 
utilized for it."3 Thomsen also noted that "The German 
Information Library in New York was developed into an 
institute of propaganda."4
In response to its new role, the Library was officially 
separated from the New York Consulate and received separate 
and extensive funding. Just how much money the Library 
received from all sources is not clear. Heribert von 
Strempel, from the Embassy, estimated that the German Library 
was paid $600,000 from embassy funds alone during the period 
from 1939 to 1941. As stated previously, (p. 11-12) the 
Library received funding from both the Foreign Ministry and 
the Propaganda Ministry, so it is possible that the German 
Library of Information received from $750,000 to $1,000,000 
from all sources for the years 1939 to 1941.5
By far the most significant increase in the output of 
German Library of Information propaganda came when the weekly 
journal Facts in Review began publication. Thomsen noted in 
November 1939 that "the periodical is proving a success and
3 Ibid., 433.
4 Ibid. Since the German Library was set up as a propaganda 
agency before this time, two meanings of this sentence are possible. 
First, Berlin may not have been aware of the Library's existence. 
Possibly since the German Library had been a Propaganda Ministry 
organization when it was first set up,the Foreign Office may not have 
been aware of it, or it may have been an announcement that the Foreign 
office had won a struggle over control of the German Library .
5 See Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 557-559.
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is quoted and occasionally attacked by the American press."6 
Facts in Review not only addressed major issues, as the 
pamphlets had done, but also provided information on German 
internal news such as employment levels, cultural information 
and a list of German-English language broadcasts and books.
All of this was done in a neat and homey, if somewhat 
contrived fashion. But this format had the advantage of 
appearing less overtly political to the reader than 
translations of official documents.
Facts in Review was widely distributed, as the German 
Library had a mailing list of 70,000 names garnered by 
Viereck. The estimate of the journal’s circulation varied from- 
around 40,000 a week according to Strempel, to 70,000, as 
estimated by the House Un-American Affairs Committee, which 
investigated the Library. The number the Committee put forth 
seems a more reliable figure, since Congress possessed a 
physical copy of the list; Strempel's interrogation occurred 
five years after the Library ceased to exist.7
In addition, its funding rose to significant levels. The 
Library's expenses mushroomed quickly after the start of the 
war. From May 1936 to August 1939 the Library spent $63,300. 
From September 1939 to March 1940, it spent $89,000. Finally, 
from April 1940 to August 1940 it spent $189,394.8 For Facts
6 Ibid., 433.
1 For the House records on the mailing list see Appendix, 1050.
For Strempel's version, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 558.
8 Appendix, 1045-1050.
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in Review alone the Library received over $13,000 per 
month. For the period from April 1940 to August 1940 the 
expenses for Facts in Review were $66,378.96. These figures 
represented the expenses of producing the magazine when it 
averaged around ten pages in length. As the weekly continued 
it grew in size to over forty pages. No doubt the expenses 
for Facts in Review saw an increase as well. However, similar 
data for the later, more lavish, issues is not available. 
Nevertheless, the early figures provide an idea of the large 
amount of capital invested by the Library in Facts in Review.9
Facts in Review remained the most significant Library 
activity. While the Library had some leeway in the 
publication of its various pamphlets, it was limited in its 
ability to issue an independent opinion, because the 
pamphlets were usually reprints of government publications.10 
In the publication of Facts in Review, the German Library of 
Information adhered closely to Dr. Thomsen's guidelines for 
German propaganda. Throughout the year and a half of its 
publication (the magazine first appeared in August 1939 and 
lasted until the consulate and Library were closed on 
Roosevelt's orders on June 16, 1941), Facts in Review 
continually espoused two of Thomsen's most important ideas. 
First, Americans were constantly reminded of the betrayal of
9 Appendix, 1048 for a break down of the production costs for 
Facts in Review.
10 The limitations were most severe in the case of the German 
White Books and would not have been nearly so much a problem in the 
case of other publications. See above p. 23.
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Wilson's fourteen points and the denial of Germany's right to 
national self-determination. The second major theme of the 
periodical was that Germany's goals in Europe represented no 
more than a German Monroe Doctrine and that the U.S. should 
easily appreciate such a policy. Each of these points about 
Germany was contrasted to British behavior, in the first part 
by its support of Poland's refusal to honor the self- 
determination principle in Danzig and, in the second, by 
Britain's continuing imperialistic role in the World. Facts 
in Review also focused on presenting the "other" Germany of 
peace and culture. Another primary purpose of the journal 
was to explain to Americans Germany's point of view on 
current events.
The first issue of Facts appeared shortly before the 
outbreak of World War II, although its role was not 
explicitly proclaimed until 1940: "It is the function of this 
publication to preserve the mutually beneficial intellectual 
contact between Germany and the United States, which great 
Americans including Longfellow, Emerson, Burgess and others 
esteemed so highly."11 It continued: "The wealth and variety 
of German life and development [are] mirrored in the pages of 
Facts in Review . . . the eternal values which enriched the
Old Germany, are alive in the New [Germany]. The Third Reich, 
while preserving these values, has made new and notable
11 F a c t s  in Review, April 10, 1940, p. 160.
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contributions to civilization, some of which are presented in 
these pages.1,12
Using the lists organized by Viereck, the issue was 
mailed out to various individuals and organizations.12 3 By late 
August 1939 it had become clear that some sort of conflict 
was near (how widespread it would be was not clear). 
Appropriately, the inaugural issue contained a 
detailed description of the German need for "living space" 
(Lebensraum). Two ideas that would resurface throughout the 
journal were featured prominently in this first issue. The 
first was the ultimate responsibility of Great Britain for 
the war and its spread. The second was that German actions in 
Europe "should be recognized throughout the world - as is the 
Monroe Doctrine."14 This explanation of Nazi ambitions as 
Germany's Monroe Doctrine for Europe, would continue 
throughout the journal's run. Together these two themes 
formed the backbone for the majority of the German Library's 
arguments.
12 Ibid.
13 Facts in Review generally arrived about a week after its 
publication date.There is some evidence that some of the earliest issues 
may have been prepared earlier but not mailed until after the date 
listed. The copies of Facts in Review viewed by the author at the 
University of Minnesota had a date received stamp on them. This
date was usually seven days after the publication date— a not 
unreasonable postal delivery time at magazine rate. The first issue for 
August 16, 1939 bears a stamp for Oct 12, 1939. The second issue 
did not arrive until January 1940. However issues three through 
seven arrived on October 12, 1939, before the second issue, at the 
same time as the first issue. It is not certain what the cause for 
the delay of the first two issues was, but it seems likely that 
the issues were hastily prepared, after their publication date.
14 Facts in Review, August 16, 1939, p. 2
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Great Britain led and directed the Allies; France was 
seen as only a minor player. In the August 24 issue of Facts 
in Review, the Library declared French participation as 
invalid. Instead, it claimed that "[France] gained 
considerable territory as the result of the World War."15 
Furthermore, "The decision as to whether there will be war 
has been handed to Britain, who in turn, handed the authority 
to . . . Poland. . . . The French people . . . don't know why
these risks have been taken."16
The early issue concentrated on the subject of the 
Danzig Corridor, the flash point for World War II.
Frequently the Library used American opinion on the 
Versailles settlement. A speech to this effect by the German 
Consul General for New York, Dr. Hans Borchers, was reprinted 
by the Library. "I only want to quote the words of one of the 
most upright and honest of men . . . the late United States
Senator William Edgar Borah. . . . 'The Polish Corridor must
be rectified. The present peace in Europe is the peace of 
brutal force.'"17 In addition, Woodrow Wilson was held to have 
opposed the creation of the corridor and only supported the 
Corridor solution "at the insistence of others who sought 
personal gain [although just where Poland's access to the sea
15 Facts in Review, August 24, 1939, p. 2
16 Ibid., 3.
17 Facts in Review, February 5, 1940, p. 38.
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mentioned in the Fourteen Points should have been, is not 
discussed] .1,18
Beyond the dictated peace of Versailles and the loss of 
German land were the alleged provocations of Poland. The 
Eastern European nation had become a "constant menace to 
order and progress in Europe."19 Further, the Poles, it 
claimed, had embarked on a "program of 'more cannons and 
fewer schools'."20 Thus, the German Library claimed, Germany 
had to right the wrong of Versailles and halt the aggression 
of its eastern neighbor.
Vile as the Polish actions were portrayed to have been, 
the ultimate responsibility for such excesses lay with 
England. According to Thomsen: "Without England's 
interference and her anti-German encirclement policy . . .  a 
reasonable German-Polish adjustment could certainly have been 
achieved long ago."21 Of England's leaders, Churchill drew the 
heaviest criticism. One issue reprinted an accusation that 
"his continuous battle-cry [was] 'Germania delenda est' 
(Germany must be destroyed). . . .  Churchill is no blessing 
for the British people. They will regret . . . the man . . .
18 Facts in Review, September 2 1939, p. 1 After the article the 
following slogan appeared at the bottom of the page: "Germany fights for 
the reparation of an injustice, the others for its preservation."19
20 FactsIbid.
in Review, September 2, 1939, p. 1.
21 Facts in Review, September 14, 1939, p., 7
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whose unscrupulous lust for power is responsible to a large 
degree for the cataclysm in Europe.22 23
Even though war had begun, the Library reminded 
Americans that Germany's aims remained moderate. All that 
was needed to restore peace was "a national frontier, which 
corresponds to our ethnic, historic and economic necessities 
. . . [and] the creation of a Polish rump-state which cannot
again be abused by the Western Powers. 1,23 Americans were urged 
not to pre-judge Germany in this conflict. Instead they 
should be guided by "the legal principle . . . 'Audiatum et
Altera Pars' (hear the other side, too) [which] corresponds 
. . . to the legal concept of the American people."24
The Library also fought the notion of Germany as a 
totalitarian society. In a speech, Dr. Borchers reminded 
Americans that, "We Germans did not surrender our freedom 
under dictation, duress, or compulsion of any kind; of our 
own free will we became an integral part of an organism 
created under the guidance of . . . [Adolf Hitler]."25 More
convincingly, the idea of the Third Reich as more in tune 
with traditional American concerns was played upon. Slogans 
such as "Germany still upholds the freedom of seas"26 were
22 Facts in Review, October 19, 1939, reprint of article by Dr. 
Giselher Wirsing, p. 6.
23 Facts in Review, November 30, 1939, p. 1.
24 Facts in Review, September 14, 1939, p. 8. Speech by Thomsen. 
Presumably his phrase concerning "the legal concept of the American 
people" refers to the practice of due process.
25 Facts in Review, October 31, 1939, p. 7.
26 Ibid., 1.
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calculated to reinforce this notion. In a speech by Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop, quoted in Facts in Review, Americans 
were reminded that Germany had respected the Monroe Doctrine 
while Britain by her maintenance of colonies and interference 
in the Western Hemisphere had clearly violated it. 
Furthermore, the issue continued, Britain had failed to pay 
its Great War debt and was angling for similar loans in the 
new conflict (and would presumably not repay those loans 
either).
Similarly, the Germans sought to downplay the 
significance of Britain's democratic institutions. Headlines 
such as "Britain's Press is Free - Free to Distort" 
underscored this message. Presumably this was intended to 
plant doubts in American minds about how truly democratic 
England was. At the same time the level of control by the 
Nazis over the German press was minimized.
At the same time as it struggled to reduce the affinity 
between the two English-speaking nations, the German Library 
tried to minimize the danger posed to America by Hitler's 
Germany. This attempt was not always uniform, however. While 
Facts in Review sought to minimize the German threat to 
America, it also sought to play up the Nazi military 
advantage over Britain and France. The net result was a 
picture of the Reich that was one of vitality and strength, 
yet one that hoped America would not be concerned over any
4 4
possible threat that Germany's economic and military hegemony 
over Europe might pose to the New World. Thus, while the 
magazine called fears of the Third Reich's intentions toward 
the Western Hemisphere a "fable," it had no difficulty 
claiming later in the same issue that Eastern Europe was the 
concern of Germany alone. The Germans, it maintained, 
respected the right of the United States to maintain and 
enforce the Monroe Doctrine and merely expected that America 
would recognize Germany's right to self determination and 
its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe as its Monroe 
Doctrine.27 What was not mentioned by Thomsen was whether 
Germany's new Monroe Doctrine would have its own version of 
the Roosevelt Corollary. If the Germans included such a 
corollary, with the right to intervene in those nations 
within its sphere in the case of "chronic wrongdoing," they 
would have the right to send troops whenever they felt it 
necessary —  as the United States had done in Latin America 
—  anywhere in Eastern Europe. With such assurances, the 
Library sought to convince Americans that they need not 
concern themselves with the fate of England or even of Europe 
as a whole.
The British Empire's abuses were also vilified in the 
pages of Facts in Review. No doubt playing on America's
8.
27 Facts in Review, September 14, 1939, Speech by Thomsen, pp. 7-
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memory of her own Revolutionary War, the German Library took 
great pains to remind the United States of the paradox of a 
democratic state that systematically denied democracy to 
those under its colonial rule. The two most obvious examples 
for this attack were Ireland and India.
In an article entitled "India: A Case Study of British 
Democracy," the German Library claimed that Senator John J. 
Blaine of Wisconsin "some years ago" had condemned the 
British use of violence against India as "a violation of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact and urged Britain to find a peaceful 
solution to India's independence."28
Despite this (and other) earlier pleas for Indian 
independence, the nation had not been made independent and 
Gandhi continued his famous non-violent resistance to British 
rule. Indeed, his refusal to support Britain, even after 
Japan's entry into the war, led to his imprisonment in 1942. 
The Library exploited this conflict, hoping that British 
repression would anger the United States. Frequent stories of 
Indian tribulations abounded and Gandhi frequently quoted: 
"Gandi [sic] declared that despite statements to the contrary 
by Prime Minister Chamberlain, the old Imperialist spirit of 
Britain is not dead."29 As a show of good will towards India 
it was announced that "Indians residing in Germany will not
28 Facts in Review, January 6, 1941, p. 8.
29 Facts in Review, December 15, 1939, p. 8.
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be treated as enemy aliens. The Reich holds that India is at 
war with Germany only by compulsion and not of its free 
will."30 The Library continued this course by reporting on 
Gandhi's progress. "Mohandas Ghandi [sic] . . . calls for
volunteers to conduct . . . civil disobedience . . . against
British rule. 'Non-violent action' he observes 'can mean the 
mobilization of world opinion in our favor, . . . men and
women all over the world are sick of the war spirit and [are] 
longing for a way to peace. India can show that way if we are 
honestly non-violent.'"31 The Library certainly hoped he would 
succeed.
The problem of Northern Ireland had plagued Britain for 
decades. Memories of the rebellion of 1916 were still fresh 
in the minds of Irish-Americans. Certainly the refusal of 
Ireland to aid Britain during this critical time 
spoke volumes about the hard feelings between the neighboring 
islands. Facts made much of this hesitation, noting with 
glee: "Ireland, England's next-door neighbor . . . refuses to
come to the aid of Great Britain. . . .  In South Africa, 
advocates of war and advocates of neutrality are almost 
equally divided. In India passive resistance is the watchword 
. . . . It is obvious the Empire is disintegrating."32
30 Ibid.
31 Facts in Review, April 8, 1940, p. 134.
32 Facts in Review, May 26, 1941, p. 289.
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Given the large Irish-American community in the United 
States, it is not surprising that Ireland also featured 
prominently in Facts in Review. The journal urged its 
readers not to assume all British colonial abuses were in the 
past: "Never let him forget that at the same time Britain 
. . . [was] pleading repentance in 1916, . . . she was
murdering, robbing and flogging with all her old-time 
abandon."33 Also, "Ireland has suffered under English 
domination more than any other nation —  and longer.
Northern Ireland is still controlled by the British. British 
methods in Ireland are so notorious that they require no 
elucidation at this point."34 Moreover, it was contended that 
Ireland was
continuing to be held to ensure Britain's command of the sea. 
Therefore,
The freedom of the seas is essential to universal 
liberty. This freedom cannot be achieved while English 
Orders in Council can destroy any small neutral country 
and drive from the sea the commerce even of great 
neutral powers. The destruction of England's domination 
of the seas would leave England— as she deserves to be 
left— one of the Great Powers, but would prevent her 
from meddling in the affairs of all other countries 
. . . . This freedom they can never have while England
dominates and controls Ireland. . . .35
33 Facts in Review,
34 Facts in Review,
35 Facts in Review,
April 2, 1941, p. 154.
January 6, 1940, p. 8.
February 19, 1949, p. 54.
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Facts in Review was convinced that the age of British 
Imperialism had not passed. Furthermore, it postulated that 
Churchill wanted to "invade or annex" Ireland because it 
refused to cooperate with the English. The German Library 
applauded Ireland's neutrality. "It has been able to stay out 
of the European holocaust into which other small states, 
pretending to be neutral . . . were drawn one by one. Are we
soon to witness an attempt to 'restore' to the Irish people 
the benefits of the 'great, free and happy' Empire which they 
so dearly 'loved' in the past?"36 In case anyone had failed to 
make the connection between America's revolution and the 
situation within the British domains, the Library pointed it 
out. "Great Britain has attempted to destroy every nation 
that dared to order its life independent of British 
despotism. Only the United States of America was able . . .
to free itself successfully from the British yoke."37 The 
German Library no doubt hoped that India and Ireland 
(including Northern Ireland) would follow the American 
example.
The reasons for England's troubles were more than simply 
internal dissent within the Empire, according to the German 
Library. The British, by their actions throughout the world, 
had earned their problems. British attacks on the remnants of 
the French Navy at Dakar, in July 1940, provided proof of
36 Facts in Review, November 18, 1939, p. 544.
37 Facts in Review, May 13, 1940, p. 190.
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Britain's continuing imperialism. In October 1940 Facts in 
Review gave its interpretation: "Even British ingenuity 
cannot find an excuse for the assault on Dakar led by a 
French traitor with the aid of the British Navy. . . . The
incident was part of a systematic British campaign to rob her 
vanquished ally of her colonies."38 This only confirmed in 
the eyes of the propagandists continuing abuses by Britannia. 
Neutrals could look forward to the treatment Norway had 
received in the Altmark incident (English ships had violated 
Norwegian neutrality to rescue seamen captured during the 
cruise of the Graf Spee). This incident was dramatized to 
Americans by comparing it to the Essex case of the War of 
1812 (where the British had denied the idea of neutral trade 
via the so-called "broken voyage" and thereby decided what 
neutral trade was and more importantly, what it was not). The 
message of the German Library article was plain: Britain had 
no intention of respecting any nation's neutral rights.39
The journal also went beyond these historical arguments 
to accuse England of still greater crimes. In a description 
of the cruise of the Graf Spee it accused the British of 
using mustard gas against the ship.40 In addition airplanes
38 Facts in Review, October 2, 1940, p. 489.
39 Facts in Review, March 4, 1940, p. 76 Headline: "British 
Disregard for Neutrals Not New."
40 Facts in Review, December 28, 1939, p. 2.
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were reputed to have been dropping self-igniting cards 
throughout Germany to create terror.41
Morale in England was supposed to be a problem, 
according to the Library. In the case of the British "blank 
check" to Poland, it was maintained that "The British people 
are not permitted to know that . . . any help Britain might 
attempt to give [Poland] would arrive too late."42 Labor 
unrest in the United Kingdom was purported to be rampant: 
"According to the Goteborgs Handels-Hach Sjofartstidning, a 
leading Swedish newspaper, more than a million British 
workers are clamoring for wage increases . . . [because of]
the huge profits realized by the armament industry since the 
beginning of the war."43 The underlying reason for the low 
morale in England was their reason for fighting: "The 
British Government is fighting for capitalist interests. . .
. She desires to have Germany in a state of economic 
dependency."44 Contrasted with this Germany's reasons were: 
"economically . . .  a reasonable standard of living . . .
strategically . . . protection against domination by some
great maritime hegemony . . . diplomatically speaking. . . a
'good neighbor' policy."45
41 Facts in Review, September 16, 1940, Facts in Review claimed 
that the true victims of these bomb-like weapons were "children and 
others who are deceived by their harmless appearance." p. 468.
42 Facts in Review, August 24, 1939, p. 3.
43 Facts in Review, September 9, 1940, p 440. This issue also 
contained a story of a man jailed for predicting the victory of Hitler's 
forces.
44 Facts in Review, February 19, 1940, p. 50
45 Facts in Review, April 15, 1940, 146
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The alleged antagonism of neutral nations towards 
Britain supported the Third Reich's claims. The German 
Library's attitudes towards the Versailles Treaty 
have already been noted. Less easy to explain were Germany's 
more contradictory acts, such as the relationship with the 
Soviet Union. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 
1939 was in force during the entire run of Facts in Review, 
thereby sparing the journal the need to reverse its largely 
pro-Russian line. Accordingly the Library stressed the 
positive aspects of the relationship. German-Soviet economic 
agreements were frequently mentioned and it was emphasized 
that these agreements represented the "permanency 
of their mutual relationship."'56 The Library even alleged that 
Britain was at fault for prolonging the Winter War between 
Finland and Russia.46 7
Far more important to the German Library of Information 
than justifying Germany's actions, was pointing out 
opposition to British goals and tactics towards other 
nations. In its campaign against the British abuse of the 
freedom of the seas, the journal used the outrage of Japan 
over British infringements on neutral trade rights. Indeed
46 Facts in Review, April 8, 1940, p. 134.
47 The Library based this accusation on Britain's alleged promises 
to Finland. This support, coupled with Finnish success in the Winter War 
prevented the Finns from compromising with Soviet demands. The U.S.S.R. 
could not withdraw without humiliation. "Propagandist exaggerations
. . . by the British press . . . tend to transform the entire Russo-
Finnish conflict into a question of prestige for the Soviet Union. It is 
this Propaganda [from Britain] which is the chief obstacle to peace." 
Facts in Review, January 22, 1940, p. 22.
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the English were openly accused of sinking the Athena early 
in the war to arouse neutral sentiment (and especially 
American sentiment) in hopes of reviving the memory of the 
Lusitania sinking that had so outraged the United States.48 
Thus, Facts in Review showed the hostility of many neutrals 
to Britain's unilateral restrictions. "Japan will not 
hesitate to take retaliatory action if the British persist in 
their plan of disregarding neutral rights. . . . During the
Napoleonic Wars, it will be recalled, the United States under 
Thomas Jefferson enacted and applied retaliatory embargo 
legislation against England's violation of American rights."49 
Russia too protested British actions. "The Russian press has 
shown considerable interest in the . . . German White Books.
The new publications are hailed for their . . . expose of the
Anglo-French policy of war extension. Particular attention is 
given to the fact that the erstwhile Allies sought to spread 
hostilities to every Russian border."50 Presumably Americans 
were to infer that the current war posed a threat to their 
rights to trade freely and that they should heed the example 
of Japan and Russia, as well as the experience of their own 
past, and oppose the willful British.
48 Facts in Review, September 9, 1939, p. 1. The Germans sank the 
Lusitania in 1915 with a torpedo. Over 100 Americans died in the 
incident, which created much animosity towards Germany. The Germans did 
not want to repeat the situation in 1939.
49 Facts in Review, December 8, 1939, p.3.
50 Facts in Review, July 29, 1940, p. 355.
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While the English were being portrayed as the 
instigators of the war, they were also pictured as suffering 
from its effects to a much greater degree than Germany. In 
fact, the journal maintained an image of Nazi Germany hardly 
changed by the war, where life went on more or less as 
normal. Militarily, economically and scientifically, Germany 
was consistently shown to be vastly superior to the British. 
This campaign began during the so-called "phony war" of late 
1939 to early 1940. The German "Strength through Joy" 
movement was said to be continuing its improvements in 
average people's lives and even expanding its activities to 
the soldiers at the front.51
On the scientific front, consumer advances gained the 
most notice. Innovations such as coal soap, synthetic tires 
and coal gasification all merited significant space in Facts 
in Review. Even the film industry of Germany was said to be 
"not only intact, but prosperous and progressive . . .  in 
sharp contrast to the disastrous reversals suffered by the 
British and French."52 Economically two trends were visible. 
First, Germany's insulation from blockade (via trade with the 
U.S.S.R. and scientific advances) was proclaimed. More 
importantly, the desire of Germany to re-enter into trade 
with United States after the war was emphasized. Evidence of
51 Facts in Review, February 13, 1940, p. 47 The article features 
such front line niceties as a bookmobile that was used to help the 
soldiers keep up on their reading.
52 Facts in Review, October 28, 1940, 522.
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the first trend has been shown. It is necessary to look 
briefly at the Library's attempts to reassure America that 
Germany would not look for markets to replace its trade with 
America in the long term.
Two quotes best exemplify this attitude. "Germany may 
easily become America's best post-war customer. Let us hope 
that it will be possible after the termination of the war to 
eliminate the frictions of the past . . .  to the mutual 
benefit of both nations."53 The journal was sure to press its 
claim for a European sphere of influence, but was quick to 
remind its readers that: "Neither the European Continent nor 
Germany desires to continue the self-sufficiency of wartime 
as the ideal economic relation for peacetime. . . .  [The two 
countries should pursue] friendly competition in the interest 
of all states, without destructive and artificial economic 
barriers, discriminations and boycotts."54 In another issue 
the magazine gave one example of hope for the post-war era: 
"The Volkswagen plant has been adapted to turning out 
military equipment. But with the coming of peace . . . the
production of [the eventual VW beetle] will be taken up again 
. . . . Dr. Porsche's dream will at last come true."55
Facts in Review also tried to minimize the conception 
of Germany as a ruthless totalitarian state. The claim of 
religious toleration was a major means of achieving this
53 Facts in Review, June 17, 1940, p. 250.
54 Facts in Review, January 13 1941, p. 10.
55 Facts in Review, May 26, 1941, 313.
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goal. Frequent notice was given throughout the journal's run 
of religious observations. Indeed, special issues were 
dedicated to the celebration of WhitSunday (Pentecost). The 
conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Germany was not 
a concern. "One of the most important elements of anti-German 
propaganda . . .  is the assertion that the National Socialist 
regime persecutes the Catholic religion and endeavors to 
replace a Christian philosophy with a neo-pagan one. . . .
[this is untrue]"56 Yet the image of Germany as continuing 
its traditional religious toleration was refuted by other 
articles on religion. Pictures of church ceremonies featured 
Nazi honor guards and swastika flags around the altar. And, 
as Dr. Heckel of the German Evangelical Church said, "the new 
Reformation [National Socialism] has also created a wealth 
of new hymns and vigorous, happy songs. The German people 
have now recovered from the frightful wrongs and sufferings 
inflicted upon them after the World War. Their grief and 
sorrow and the materialistic moral decline have been washed 
away by new courage and new strength."57
Pictures featured prominently in the journal. At first 
there were no photographs or drawings of any kind. Gradually 
small photographs began to appear in its pages. Later, 
photographs would consume, at times, half of the space in an 
issue. The photographs also had a propaganda message. Often
56 Facts in Review, October 29, 1940, p. 514.
57 Facts in Review, May 6, 1940, p. 178.
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German youths were shown frolicking in meadows, or some such
pastoral scene. A darker side was also evident. As the war
progressed, battle photographs as well as pictures of
Germany's military leaders became more evident. By the use of
these images, Facts in Review sought to portray a peaceful 
Germany that had been thrust into war, willing and capable 
of doing whatever was necessary to win it.
As European nations fell under Nazi occupation, many 
people in the United States began to fear for the safety of 
the populations of these nations. Facts in Review, aware of 
this concern, made frequent mention of "progress" in Poland, 
France and elsewhere. Denmark had fallen to the Germans in 
April of 1940. Pictures of its King, Christian X, who chose 
to remain in the country, graced one issue while the 
accompanying article stated that "in Denmark there were no 
ravages of war to repair because its king refused to make 
his country a pawn of the Allies on the checker-board of 
diplomacy and war."58 Also, plans for a tunnel to Sweden were 
said to be advancing, giving the impression that in certain 
parts of Europe at least, things were progressing well. The 
Jewish question was conspicuously absent from Facts in 
Review. In fact the verbal assault against the Jews only 
appears in translations of Hitler's speeches. Hitler's 
speeches, interestingly enough, appeared only infrequently in 
the pages of the journal.
58 Facts in Review, June 7, 1940,p. 222.
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The magazine sought to contradict the notion of a Europe 
in chains under Nazi domination and, above all, to convince 
its readers that Germany, even if victorious in Europe, 
constituted no threat to America. Hermann Goering's opinions 
on this issue were reprinted: "He stressed Germany's desire 
to preserve and uphold her political and economic ties with 
the United States [and he considered] a healthy 
reconstruction of Europe and of the world is possible only in 
cooperation with the United States. "59 On the same issue 
Hitler is quoted concerning America's role in Europe. "The 
essence of the Monroe Doctrine was not only to prevent 
European states from interfering in American affairs (which 
England with her great political and territorial interests in 
America keeps doing incessantly); but quite as much to 
restrain the North American Union from meddling with European 
affairs . "60
Thus Americans were assured that they had nothing to 
fear, militarily and economically, from a victorious Germany. 
However, the United States also needed to recognize that 
while Germany would not interfere in the American sphere, 
Germany would tolerate no outside interference in its 
European sphere.
59 Facts in Review, Aug 12, 1940, p. 378. Italicized in original.
50 Facts in Review, July 1, 1940, p. 282.
Chapter Five
The Dies Committee and the Fate of the Library
The activities of the German Library did not escape the 
notice of the U.S. Government. As the Library expanded, it 
became more visible. In 1940 Representative Martin Dies from 
Texas and the Committee on Un-American Activities and 
Propaganda in the United States began to focus their 
attention on the German Library, as they had previously on 
the German-American Bund and communist groups.
The Committee clearly defined the difference between 
American and un-American activities:
Americanism is the recognition of the . . .inherent
and fundamental rights of man . . . [derived] from God
and not from governments. . . . Among these inalienable
rights . . . are 1) Freedom of worship; 2) freedom of
speech; 3) freedom of press; 4) freedom of 
assemblage. . . . The essence of Americanism is
therefore class, religious, and racial tolerance. . . .
The man who advocates class hatred is plainly un- 
American even if he professes racial and religious 
tolerance.1
The ideas set out by the Committee conflicted with one 
another. Just how freedom of speech could be reconciled with 
the censure of unpopular views was unclear. Many Americans
1 U.S. House of Representatives Report no. 2 Investigation of Un- 
American Activities and Propaganda, p. 10. 76th Congress 1st Session.
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in this period of racial segregation and bigotry would hardly 
qualify as loyal Americans under the Committee's definition. 
Crystal clear, however, was the intent of the Committee to 
defend the United States from enemies abroad and within. 
Americans who used their freedom of speech to support either 
Communist or Fascist ideology were at risk of being labelled 
un-American and even being jailed for these views. The vile 
nature of the Nazi regime cannot be condoned. However, the 
throttling of freedom of speech before the outbreak of the 
war is also reprehensible. In a minority report of the Dies 
Committee Jerry Voorhis of California recognized the threat 
to free speech.
Once, however, the [Dies] committee undertakes to 
accuse people of un-American activities because they 
criticize certain features of our economy or say unkind 
things about finance, capitalism or because they come 
out for a greater degree of cooperation in our economic 
life, it is in danger of becoming an agency that 
arrogates to itself the right to censor people's ideas. 
That in itself is un-American. . . . The majority report
is shot through with statements accusing people of being 
un-American not because they are Nazis, Fascists, or 
Communists, but because their political or economic 
beliefs or opinions are not orthodox as judged by the 
committee majority.2
Nevertheless, the records of the German Library of 
Information were subpoenaed by the Committee in August 1940 
and its officials were required to present themselves for 
questioning. The director of the Library, Dr. Matthias
2 77th Congress 2nd session Report 2277 part 2. July 7, 1942,
4-5.
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Schmitz, testified before the committee and was asked to 
explain the Library's relationship to the Consulate. Schmitz 
testified that the Library had been separate from the 
Consulate as of September 1939. The Library submitted a 
report to the Committee detailing the number of employees and 
their functions. These included a central or administrative 
section, research, archives, mailing, correspondence, book­
keeping and editorial departments. There were 30 employees, 
all of whom were German nationals. Also included in the 
report was George Viereck and his relationship to the 
Library.3
The New York Times followed the proceedings of the 
Committee closely. It reprinted the accusation that the 
Library constituted a "local fifth column and Nazi spy 
headquarters" and, more truthfully, reporting the German 
Library as "one of the largest German agencies in this 
country for the dissemination of Nazi information."4 The 
Library was linked to the Trans-Ocean organization in this 
probe.5 The Dies report included several letters between the 
two organizations, which showed that Trans-Ocean served as a 
source of information and articles for the Library.6 This
3 Appendix, 1047-1049.
4 New York Times August 31, 1940 p. 4:3 "Reich Library Here Gets 
Dies Summons."
5 See above, page 29, for Thomsen's admission that Trans-Ocean was 
recognized as a Nazi agency.
6 Appendix, 1051-1052.
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connection showed that the Library relied on Nazi agencies 
for some of its information, which obviously undermined the 
Library's claims of independence. While the Committee and its 
chairman were convinced by their investigation that such 
activities as those carried on by the German Library 
constituted a threat to the U.S., it was not until June of 
1941 that action was taken to close the German Library of 
Information.
In the meantime, the Library had become involved in 
difficulties of a different sort. In connection with its 
mailing practices, it has been mentioned that several 
individuals had become upset at being placed on the German 
Library's mailing list. The Library found itself sued in New 
York Court by the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League for failing 
to register its activities properly. Because it had 
officially separated from the Consulate in September 1939 in 
order to appear a more objective source of information, the 
Library was considered a private organization. As such it was 
required to register with the City.7 The court case alleged 
that the Library failed to follow the law, and Schmitz was 
imprisoned. In order to secure his release, the Embassy in 
Washington was forced to come forth with proof that the 
German Library did not need the City certificate because it 
was an agency of the Nazi Government. The ruling of the judge
i New York Times September 14, 1940 p. 5:2
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was of interest: "However contemptible the defendant may be 
in other respects, [a] great disservice would be done to any 
government of laws if the defendant were to be punished 
otherwise than in accordance with the law."8
The Library also suffered another public image setback 
when an individual wrote to the Times to compare the German 
Library with the British Library of Information.9 The British 
organization was small; it permitted private citizens to see 
its mailing list of 4,000 names. The German Library of 
Information, by comparison, was secretive with its 70,000- 
name list. Also the comparison of the British Library's 
American staff with the German Library's all-German staff, 
did not support the Library's claim of objectivity.
The combination of the Dies investigation, the arrest of 
Schmitz, the Library's German staff, and ties to the 
Consulate and Embassy lost for it any sort of credibility it 
had built up as an objective organization. The directives 
originally established for the Library suggested staying away 
from indigenous American groups working towards the same 
ends, i.e., to keep the U.S. out of war. The maintenance of a 
German staff and its physical nearness to the consulate were 
strange oversights indeed for an organization designed to 
convince the American public that it was in their own
8 New York Times September 20, 1940 p. 9:30 "Nazi Agent Freed on 
Embassy Plea."
9 New York Times September 18, 1940 p. 22:6 letter from R.W. Rus. 
"On the Matter of Propaganda."
63
best interest to keep the U.S. out of a European war. For the 
time being, however, the Library was allowed to continue its 
activities.
The worsening relations between Washington and Berlin 
caused by a series of incidents, beginning in November 1938 
with Kristallnacht, culminated in the closing of the German 
Library of Information. On June 16, 1941 the Under Secretary 
of State, Sumner Welles, presented a note to officials of the 
German Embassy in Washington requesting that the German 
Consulates throughout the country and organizations 
affiliated with them (such as the Library, Trans-Ocean and 
the German Railway and Tourist Agency) be closed. The reason 
given for this decision was as follows:
It has come to the knowledge of this Government 
that agencies of the German Reich in this country, 
including German consular establishments, have been 
engaged in activities wholly outside the scope of their 
legitimate duties. These activities have been of an 
improper and unwarranted character. They render the 
continued presence in the United States of those 
agencies and consular establishments inimical to the 
welfare of this country.10
Thomsen rejected this decision as "arbitrary and unfounded." 
Nevertheless, the Consulates and other organizations attached 
to them, including the German Library, had until July 10,
1941 to comply. The Library had ceased to exist.
10 Memorandum from Secretary of State to German Charge June 16, 
1941. Reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume II 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office,1949), 629.
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The employees of the Library returned to Germany. For 
George Sylvester Viereck, an American citizen, the solution 
was not so easy. Viereck, it will be recalled, had served the 
Library as editor of Facts in Review, as well as in other 
respects (none of his activities on behalf of the Library 
were public knowledge). For this work, as well as his 
affiliation with the publishing house of Flanders Hall and 
other activities, Viereck was indicted. This was a bizarre 
ending to the story of the man who most directly influenced 
the output of the German Library of Information.11 He was 
convicted of failing to accurately report his activities 
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and was sentenced 
to 8 months to 2 years on each count.1 2 However, in March 1943 
the Supreme Court threw out his conviction. He was retried in 
June 1943 and found guilty again. He was sentenced to 1-5 
years. At the same time he was tried under the Sedition Act 
for allegedly promoting insubordination among the U.S. Armed 
Forces. He was never convicted of this crime, but due to the 
fact that the trial dragged on from April 1944 to the spring 
of 1947, Viereck was not granted parole on his Foreign Agent 
Act conviction until May of that year.13
11 Matthias Schmitz, as Heinz Beller before him, had been the 
nominal head of the German Library. They were administrators, while 
Viereck did most of the actual work of editing.
12 The information on the legal battles of Viereck can be found in 
Neil M. Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck: German-American Propagandist. 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 206-250.
13 Viereck wrote letters to the District Court in Washington in 
order to request parole. He also sent these letters to Senator Langer, 
requesting his assistance. The letters were unremarkable. For their
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The conviction and harassment of Viereck confirmed the 
fears of the Dies Committee minority report quoted 
previously. George Viereck was guilty of supporting a vile 
regime that represented a dire threat to the world. However 
his support was within the Constitutional boundaries of 
freedom of speech and his activities had occurred prior to 
the outbreak of war. In his support and work with Nazi 
agencies, including the German Library, he was guilty only of 
associating with a foreign government. One author interpreted 
Viereck's actions. "The machinations of Viereck, along with 
those of the Native Fascists, presented a challenge of the 
first order to a government committed to freedom of speech 
and political activity, and yet obligated to protect itself 
against political danger."14 Viereck undertook his activities 
because he was convinced that Germany was being unjustly 
criticized. Unfortunately, he failed to withdraw his support 
after the truly heinous nature of the Third Reich became 
visible. While the actions of Viereck were distasteful, the 
repression of his unpopular viewpoint was the most 
regrettable feature of the story of the Library.15
contents see Orin G. Libby Manuscript Collection, Elwyn B. Robinson 
Department of Special Collections, Chester Fritz Library, University of 
North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota. William Langer Papers, Box 128, 
Folder 25.
14 Morris Schonbach, Native Fascism during the 1930 's and 1940 's:
A Study of its Roots, its Growth, and its Decline (Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis: University of California, 1958), 358.
15 In addition, much of the evidence against Viereck was obtained 
without a search warrant. Johnson, p. 224.
Conclusion
Having looked at German policies in the instance of the 
German Library of Information, what can be said about Nazi 
propaganda in the United States? First, it seems clear that 
the Library (and as far as one can generalize, Germany 
itself) sought chiefly to keep the U.S. from actively 
involving itself in the war in Europe. The Nazis attempted to 
do this by issuing pamphlets and Facts in Review.
The pamphlets, published throughout the Library's 
existence, represented limited opportunities to express an 
opinion independent of Berlin. Independent expression 
generally was in the preface or conclusion to these works. 
Even so a clear propaganda line can be found: that Britain's 
interference on the Continent was responsible for the war. 
Furthermore, it claimed, England had prolonged the war and 
expanded it into previously neutral nations (Norway, etc.). 
All of these actions aimed to deny Germany its place in 
Europe. Coupled with this was a blind ambition to cripple 
Germany under the unfair terms of the Versailles Treaty.
Along with the disreputable motives of Britain,
the German Library of Information emphasized the economic,
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military, and cultural strength of Germany. The reason for 
this two-fold approach is easy to explain. The German Library 
did not want America actively intervening in the war and 
sought to convince it not to do so by "exposing" Britain's 
aims and methods, thereby making alliance with England 
distasteful. Just as important, it also tried to present 
Germany as a modern colossus, immune from assault, even from 
America. Thus the German Library presented United States 
entry into the conflict as only serving Britain and possibly 
failing to defeat Germany in the bargain.
Facts in Review also followed that path. In this 
journal the Library was much freer to express its 
propagandist opinions than it had been in the translations of 
official German publications. The weekly, over the course of 
its run, grew from a sparse four pages in 1939 to almost 40 
pages in 1941. Again, and in much greater detail than in the 
pamphlets, Facts in Review repeated the idea of the perfidy 
of Britain, but emphasized German actions as a new Monroe 
Doctrine more than the pamphlets had. Certainly the German 
Library of Information tried to reassure Americans of the 
non-threatening nature of Nazi Germany, while reminding its 
readers of the military prowess of the state. The picture 
presented by Facts in Review was similar to the one shown 
what in the Library's other publications; a presentation of 
a new Germany, strong in culture, economics and the military 
arts. This nation, moreover, was currently acting as other
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nations had —  in its own interests —  but presented no 
threat to others, once its Lebensraum had been achieved. It 
preferred peace, of course, but was prepared to fight, and 
win, any war forced on it.
Did the German Library achieve the goals for its 
propaganda campaign? Certainly the Library followed Hitler's 
basic ideas of broad-based propaganda appeals constantly 
repeated that did not distinguish between degrees of guilt.
In addition, Dr. Thomsen's recommendations were also 
employed, particularly the emphasis on the negative lessons 
of American intervention in World War I, and the parallel 
between Nazi actions in Europe and American actions under the 
Monroe Doctrine. It also sought to undermine American 
sympathy for Great Britain by reminding Americans of 
England's past and present abuses of neutral rights. Thus the 
Library presented the war to its American readers as an 
unnecessary event caused by Britain. The United States, by 
assisting England, would only compromise the application of 
national self-determination abroad. Moreover, the outcome of 
the war need not concern its readers, the Library reassured 
them, because a victorious Third Reich posed no threat to the 
security of the Western Hemisphere.
Can an assessment be made of how effective the German 
Library of Information was in its propaganda campaign? The 
U.S. remained neutral from September 1939 to December 1941, 
in the face of considerable pressure —  from the British and
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increasingly Roosevelt himself —  to join the Allied cause. 
Roosevelt believed that despite his destroyer deal of 1940 
and the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, he could not count absolutely 
on American public support for active intervention in Europe. 
Obviously it cannot be assumed that this was the result of 
Nazi propaganda, let alone that it was due to the influence 
of the German Library. In the end, Nazi aggression in 
Poland, France and throughout Europe convinced Americans to 
oppose Hitler.
The Gallup Polls of the time can provide some insight 
into the attitude of Americans to the Third Reich. In 
September 1939 82 percent of Americans polled believed that 
Germany was responsible for the outbreak of war, while only 3 
percent believed that Britain and France were to blame.1 The 
best gauge of increasing American animosity towards the Third 
Reich were the following questions. In October 1939,
Americans were asked, "If it appears that Germany is 
defeating England and France, should the United States 
declare war on Germany and send our army and navy to Europe 
to fight?" 71 percent answered no to the question.1 2 In the 
same month, however, 84 percent of Americans polled wanted 
the Allies to win the war. The German Library of Information 
sought to exploit this paradox. Thomsen had acknowledged that 
American publican opinion was against Nazi Germany in 1939.
1 Dr. George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971. 
Volume I (New York: Random House, 1972), 179.
2 Ibid. p. 186.
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He was right. The Library was set up to help change American 
opinion. Did it succeed?
It is not possible to prove directly that the German 
Library of Information's propaganda campaign was successful 
or unsuccessful. The Gallup Polls offered mixed results. On 
one hand, 76 percent of Americans opposed active entry into 
the war.3 However, in response to the question, "Would you 
rather see Britain surrender to Germany than have the United 
States go into the war?", 62 percent answered no.4 While a 
majority of Americans still opposed U.S. entry into the 
conflict, a significant shift had occurred in those willing 
to go to war to save Britain.
What does all of this prove? While the statistics are 
not conclusive, American opinion of Germany worsened from 
1939 to 1941. This cannot be said to have been the fault of 
the German Library of Information, but clearly Nazi 
propaganda in the United States failed to shift American 
public opinion to a more sympathetic view of the Third Reich.
Nazi propaganda and the German Library of Information 
utilized the ideas examined here in an attempt to reinforce 
isolationist notions, but it is by no means clear that German 
propaganda and the German Library of Information decisively 
aided the spread of this sentiment. The New York Times was 
clearly unmoved. In April 1941, it pointed out the
3 Ibid. 286.
4 Ibid. 282.
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contradictions between the Library's appeals for peace and 
Germany's actions in the Balkans. The newspaper concluded: 
"The editors of Facts in Review are our guests, allowed by 
our national hospitality to sneer, to insult our friends, to 
belittle what we hold sacred. It is only fair to do what one 
can to enlarge the scope of their 'Facts'."5
German propaganda in World War II was generally of good 
quality and the Library was above average. It was somewhat 
more subdued in manner than most German propaganda; for 
example, aside from a few reprints of Hitler's speeches, the 
harangue of hatred against the Jews, so common in Nazi 
rhetoric, never appears.
The Library was justified in some of its views. The 
Versailles Treaty was harsh, the Polish Corridor was a denial 
of German national self-determination, and the British did 
violate Norwegian neutrality. To these examples can be added 
the British treatment of the people of its Empire (especially 
in India) and the similarity between of Germany's 
expansionist desires and the American use of the Monroe 
Doctrine. In its propaganda campaign the German Library 
struck many sparks. These sparks never burst into flame, as 
most Americans realized that no matter how polished the 
arguments, German propaganda, as represented by the German
5 New York Times April 27, 1941 Section 4, p 10 "'Facts' and 
Facts."
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Library of Information, was based on half-truths and lies and 
only served as a facade for a vile repressive regime.
t
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